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Updated: Jul 23, 2026

An Experimental Analysis of Children's Ability to Provide a False Report about a Crime
Published on: May 3, 2016
Young children's understanding of fact beliefs versus value beliefs
J H Flavell1, E R Flavell, F L Green
1Department of Psychology, Stanford University, CA 94305-2099.
Abstract:
Recent research on the development of children's knowledge about the mind has shown that young 3-year-olds have difficulty inferring that another person holds a false belief about a matter of verifiable fact, even when provided with considerable help. 4 studies tested the hypothesis that they would have less difficulty inferring that another person holds an odd, nonnormative belief about a matter of taste or value--one which, like the false fact belief, they themselves do not hold. On fact-belief tasks, an experimenter acted as if, or even explicitly stated that, she believed that the contents of a container were other than what the children knew to be the case. On value-belief tasks, she behaved as if she believed that a stimulus had a good or bad taste, smell, or appearance, whereas they thought it had the opposite. The results of all 4 studies confirmed the hypothesis.
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