Inferences from counterfactual threats and promises

We examine how people understand and reason from counterfactual threats, for example, "if you had hit your sister, I would have grounded you" and counterfactual promises, for example, "if you had tidied your room, I would have given you ice-cream." The first experiment shows that people consider counterfactual threats, but not counterfactual promises, to have the illocutionary force of an inducement. They also make the immediate inference that the action mentioned in the "if" part of the counterfactual threat and promise did not occur. The second experiment shows that people make more negative inferences (modus tollens and denial of the antecedent) than affirmative inferences (modus ponens and affirmation of the consequent) from counterfactual threats and promises, unlike indicative threats and promises. We discuss the implications of the results for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie conditional inducements.