Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Science
• Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• Predictive processing models perception as Bayesian inference.
• Sensorimotor accounts explain perceptual presence through action possibilities.
• Synesthetic concurrents present a challenge to existing perceptual theories.

Purpose of the Study:

• To evaluate Seth's extension of predictive processing using counterfactuals.
• To assess the explanatory power of counterfactuals for synesthetic concurrents.
• To compare Seth's model with enactive theory for explaining subjective experience.

Main Methods:

• Theoretical analysis of predictive processing and counterfactual reasoning.
• Critique of Seth's model regarding synesthetic concurrents.
• Argument for the suitability of enactive theory.

Main Results:

• Seth's counterfactual model mathematically formulates the sensorimotor account of perceptual presence.
• The model explains synesthetic concurrents via impoverished counterfactuals.
• This explanation inadequately addresses the lack of objecthood in concurrents.

Conclusions:

• Seth's counterfactual explanation for synesthetic concurrents is insufficient.
• Enactive theory offers a superior framework for explaining the lack of subjectivity veridicality in concurrents.
• The external world shapes experience primarily during veridical perception.