Personhood: An essential characteristic of the human species

This essay postulates that human social order recognizes the personhood of human beings within two competing constructs-an existential construct that personhood is a state of being inherent and essential to the human species, and a relational construct that personhood is a conditional state of value defined by society. These competing constructs establish personhood in both individual and interpersonal contexts. Within the individual context existential personhood may be posited as a distinctly human state within the natural order, intrinsic to human life, and independent of the status of the human being. In the interpersonal context the existential construct holds that personhood is not a creation of the society, is not a right, and may not be altered or removed by human fiat. Relational theory presents contra assertions in these two contexts. The Christian view is taken as a particular case of existential personhood. Arguments concerning the nature of human personhood are metaphysical and consist of philosophical beliefs which may be properly asserted in either construct. The interpersonal context of personhood lends itself to comparative analysis of the empirical results associated with both the existential and the relational constructs. This essay provides an overview analysis of the existential and relational constructs of personhood in the interpersonal context and finds a broad range of results that are manifestly superior under existential theory. Such empiricism supports a normative conclusion that the good rests in the existential construction of human personhood, and gives credence to a claim of truth that personhood is an essential characteristic of the human species and is not a conditional state dependent upon circumstance, perception, cognition, or societal dictum.