Objectivity in confirmation: post hoc monsters and novel predictions.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Epistemology
• Scientific Methodology

Background:

• Confirmation theory seeks to define the evidential support for hypotheses.
• Predictivism posits that confirming hypotheses requires novel predictions, but faces challenges.
• The problem of "post hoc monsters" highlights limitations in current confirmation accounts.

Purpose of the Study:

• To establish cornerstones for an objective theory of confirmation.
• To learn from the failures of predictivist approaches to confirmation.
• To revise the challenge of defining confirmation beyond inferential-semantical relations.

Main Methods:

• Critical analysis of predictivism, focusing on Worrall's sophisticated version.
• Identification of key principles (cornerstones) for a robust confirmation theory.
• Examination of inferential-semantical relations between hypotheses and evidence.

Main Results:

• Predictivism's failures stem from including contingent considerations.
• A demand to remove contingent factors is identified as a cornerstone.
• The initial challenge regarding confirmation is deemed flawed and requires revision.

Conclusions:

• An objective theory of confirmation necessitates removing contingent factors.
• Lessons from predictivism failures guide the development of a revised confirmation challenge.
• The proposed cornerstones offer a path toward a more complete confirmation account.