Francis, fatalism and the fundamental attribution error: a reply to Philip Darbyshire

Philip Darbyshire has apparently gained the impression that I used 'gee-whiz' social psychology to 'absolve poor or negligent practice from any hint of personal responsibility and accountability'. In this reply, I first discuss the fundamental attribution error, which Darbyshire trivialises as the 'fundamental arrogance error' and a piece of 'linguistic puffery'. Second I examine Darbyshire's rather naive view of causation. Third, I suggest that, on a more defensible view of causality, situations as causes do not absolve nurses from 'any hint' of personal responsibility, but they do set limits to responbility, even if Darbyshire finds this morally incovenient. Finally, I argue that the focus on individual accountability should give way to a public health model of containment and prevention. I conclude with some remarks on 'outsider disbelief'.