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Updated: Mar 15, 2026

Antibiotic Dereplication Using the Antibiotic Resistance Platform
Published on: October 17, 2019
Promoting Antibacterial Drug Development: Select Policies and Challenges.
Aylin Sertkaya1, Amber Jessup2, Hui-Hsing Wong2
1Eastern Research Group, Inc., 110 Hartwell Avenue, Lexington, MA, 02421, USA. aylin.sertkaya@erg.com.
Incentives for antibacterial drug development need careful design. Current policies may not sufficiently encourage early-stage research or may overcompensate for later stages, impacting the fight against antimicrobial resistance.
Area of Science:
- Health Economics
- Pharmaceutical Policy
- Infectious Disease Research
Background:
- The antibacterial drug development pipeline is insufficient to meet the growing demand for treatments against rising antimicrobial resistance.
- Existing efforts to incentivize antibacterial drug development have proven inadequate.
- There is a critical need for targeted incentives that promote both the creation of new antibacterial drugs and their responsible use.
Purpose of the Study:
- To analyze the impact of two distinct incentive mechanisms on the financial returns of antibacterial drug companies.
- To evaluate a 5-year delay in generic competition and a US$50 million prize for Food and Drug Administration approval as potential incentives.
- To inform policy development for fostering innovation in antibacterial drug development.
Main Methods:
- Utilized a decision-tree framework developed for the US Department of Health and Human Services.
- Modeled the drug company decision-making process as a revenue maximization problem under conditions of uncertainty.
- Applied economic principles to assess the efficacy of different incentive structures.
Main Results:
- Incentive effectiveness is contingent upon the specific indications a new antibacterial drug targets and its stage of development.
- A one-size-fits-all approach to incentives is suboptimal for maximizing societal benefit.
- The analyzed incentives demonstrate a tendency to under-incentivize early-stage development while over-incentivizing late-stage development.
Conclusions:
- Optimal policies must balance societal benefits (e.g., reduced public health burden from infectious diseases) with social costs.
- Incentive structures should be tailored to address the specific challenges of different development stages.
- Current incentive models require refinement to effectively stimulate the development of novel antibacterial agents and ensure prudent use, thereby combating antimicrobial resistance.
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Drug Regulation
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