Extensional scientific realism vs. intensional scientific realism

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Epistemology

Background:

• Scientific realism debates the justification of scientific theories.
• Extensional and intensional realism offer contrasting views on theory justification.
• The pessimistic induction challenges scientific realism by citing historical theory failures.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the relationship between extensional and intensional scientific realism.
• To evaluate the immunity of extensional realism to the pessimistic induction.
• To demonstrate the inherent limitations of extensional realism in theory selection.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
• Critique of Fitzpatrick's argument on extensional realism and the pessimistic induction.
• Examination of the theoretical underpinnings of extensional scientific realism.

Main Results:

• Extensional scientific realism implicitly relies on intensional realism for its justification.
• Extensional realism is not immune to the pessimistic induction without recourse to intensional realism.
• Extensional realism lacks an internal mechanism for distinguishing believable from unbelievable theories.

Conclusions:

• The justification of extensional scientific realism is dependent on intensional realist resources.
• A robust response to the pessimistic induction requires integrating intensional realist principles.
• Extensional realism, in isolation, is insufficient for theory evaluation and selection.