What moral character is and is not

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Moral Philosophy
• Virtue Ethics

Background:

• Louise Mitchell's interpretation of character as a potency is discussed.
• Aristotle's philosophical framework regarding the soul is central to the analysis.

Purpose of the Study:

• To argue that moral character is the sum of moral habits and dispositions, not a potency.
• To re-evaluate Mitchell's claims using Aristotelian philosophy and common language usage.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of Aristotle's threefold division of things in the soul (potency, habit, emotion).
• Examination of Aristotle's and common usage of the term 'character'.
• Critique of Mitchell's reliance on the Summa Theologiae for moral character definition.

Main Results:

• Character, when correctly applying Aristotle's divisions, belongs to the category of habit.
• Common language usage supports the view of character as habits and dispositions.
• The Summa Theologiae passage Mitchell uses pertains to sacramental, not moral, character.

Conclusions:

• Moral character is best understood as the sum of an individual's moral habits and dispositions.
• The potential for character development resides in the rational powers of the human soul.
• Humans, unlike other animals, possess the rational faculties necessary for developing moral character.