Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue?

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Language
• Epistemology
• Cognitive Science

Background:

• The term 'intuition' is prevalent in philosophical discourse and methodology discussions.
• Concerns exist that 'intuition-talk' may not offer a clear semantic contribution, suggesting it could be an unproductive habit.
• This perspective questions the utility and meaning of relying on intuition in philosophical arguments.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate the semantic contribution of 'intuition-talk' in philosophy.
• To explore the potential pragmatic roles and benefits of using 'intuition' in philosophical methods.
• To challenge the view that 'intuition-talk' is a detrimental habit and argue for its potential value.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of the semantic and pragmatic functions of 'intuition-talk' within philosophical literature.
• Review of arguments suggesting 'intuition-talk' is a 'bad habit'.
• Consideration of empirical support for the cognitive roles of intuition in philosophical reasoning.

Main Results:

• The study identifies multiple pragmatic roles that 'intuition-talk' can fulfill in philosophical inquiry.
• It challenges the direct inference that a lack of clear semantic contribution equates to a bad habit.
• Empirical evidence suggests that 'intuition-talk' may reflect genuine cognitive processes beneficial to philosophers.

Conclusions:

• Caution is advised against abandoning 'intuition-talk' solely based on semantic concerns.
• Intuition-talk may play significant pragmatic roles, enhancing philosophical discussion and method.
• There is a plausible basis, supported by empirical findings, for considering 'intuition-talk' a beneficial habit for philosophers.