Presumed innocent? How tacit assumptions of intentional structure shape moral judgment

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Moral Psychology
• Developmental Psychology

Background:

• The presumption of innocence is a legal and human rights principle.
• Psychological basis for inferring intentions, especially with complex actions, is poorly understood.
• Existing moral judgment theories often overlook or assume solutions to intention inference.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate how adults and children infer goals and intentions behind actions with multiple effects.
• To propose and test a 'good intention prior' as a solution to the intention inference problem in moral judgment.

Main Methods:

• Designed novel experiments to assess intention inference in adults and preschool children.
• Focused on scenarios where actions yield both positive and negative outcomes.
• Examined the role of domain-specific prior knowledge and core cognitive processes.

Main Results:

• Provided the first empirical evidence for the existence of a 'good intention prior'.
• Demonstrated that both adults and preschool children exhibit this prior.
• Showed a rebuttable presumption that actors intend good effects over bad effects.

Conclusions:

• The 'good intention prior' helps explain how individuals infer intentions in morally ambiguous situations.
• This cognitive mechanism supports the psychological underpinnings of the presumption of innocence.
• Findings highlight the importance of innate or early-developed cognitive biases in moral reasoning.