Brain Interventions, Moral Responsibility, and Control over One's Mental Life

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Neuroethics
• Moral Psychology

Background:

• Theoretical discussions on moral responsibility often involve manipulated agents who perform actions due to externally influenced pro-attitudes.
• Neurological modifications, such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), raise practical questions about an individual's moral responsibility.
• Existing literature, including work by Sharp and Wasserman, explores historical views of responsibility in the context of such modifications.

Purpose of the Study:

• To contribute to the discussion on moral responsibility concerning manipulated agents and neurological interventions.
• To argue for a specific historical view of responsibility that incorporates the agent's control over their mental life.
• To explore the practical implications of this refined historical view for determining responsibility in cases involving neurological modifications.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of theoretical literature on moral responsibility and manipulated agents.
• Engagement with existing arguments, specifically those by Daniel Sharp and David Wasserman, on historical views of responsibility.
• Development of a refined historical perspective that includes the concept of agent control over mental states.

Main Results:

• The paper argues that a robust historical view of responsibility must account for the agent's control over their mental life.
• It posits that the bypassing of this control through manipulation or intervention is a key factor in assessing responsibility.
• The proposed view offers a framework for evaluating responsibility in individuals undergoing procedures like Deep Brain Stimulation.

Conclusions:

• The application of historical views to cases of neurological modification requires careful consideration of the agent's mental control.
• Determining moral responsibility in manipulated agents necessitates an understanding of how their volitional capacities were affected.
• This approach has significant practical implications for legal and ethical assessments in neuroethics.