It's Friendship, Jim, but Not as We Know It: A Degrees-of-Friendship View of Human-Robot Friendships

This article argues in defence of human-robot friendship. I begin by outlining the standard Aristotelian view of friendship, according to which there are certain necessary conditions which x must meet in order to 'be a friend'. I explain how the current literature typically uses this Aristotelian view to object to human-robot friendships on theoretical and ethical grounds. Theoretically, a robot cannot be our friend because it cannot meet the requisite necessary conditions for friendship. Ethically, human-robot friendships are wrong because they are deceptive (the robot does not actually meet the conditions for being a friend), and could also make it more likely that we will favour 'perfect' robots, and disrespect, exploit, or exclude other human beings. To argue against the above position, I begin by outlining and assessing current attempts to reject the theoretical argument-that we cannot befriend robots. I argue that the current attempts are problematic, and do little to support the claim that we can be friends with robots now (rather than in some future time). I then use the standard Aristotelian view as a touchstone to develop a new degrees-of-friendship view. On my view, it is theoretically possible for humans to have some degree of friendship with social robots now. I explain how my view avoids ethical concerns about human-robot friendships being deceptive, and/or leading to the disrespect, exploitation, or exclusion of other human beings.