Re-asserting the Specialness of Health Care

Is health care "special"? That is, do we have moral reason to treat health care differently from how we treat other sorts of social goods? Intuitively, perhaps, we might think the proper response is "yes." However, to date, philosophers have often struggled to justify this idea-known as the "specialness thesis about health care" or STHC. In this article, I offer a new justification of STHC, one I take to be immune from objections that have undercut other defenses. Notably, unlike previous utility- and opportunity-based theories, I argue that we can find normative justification for STHC in what I term our special duty to assist those unable to help themselves. It is this duty, I argue, that ultimately gives us reason to treat health care differently from other sorts of goods (even other goods meeting health needs) and to distribute it independently of individuals' ability to pay.