Reframing Single- and Dual-Process Theories as Cognitive Models: Commentary on De Neys (2021)

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Philosophy of Mind
• Computational Neuroscience

Background:

• The debate on single-process versus dual-process theories of thought is currently facing challenges of empirical intractability and scientific inconsequence.
• Traditional framing of this debate focuses on whether thought processes share defining properties or possess distinct ones.

Purpose of the Study:

• To reframe the single- vs. dual-process theories of thought debate.
• To establish the scientific consequentiality and empirical tractability of the debate through a new framing.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of existing theoretical frameworks.
• Proposing a shift in understanding single- and dual-process theories from property-based claims to algorithmic claims within cognitive modeling.

Main Results:

• The traditional framing of the single- vs. dual-process debate renders it empirically intractable and scientifically inconsequential.
• Reframing the debate in terms of cognitive models—specifically, the number of broad algorithm types implemented by thought processes—restores its scientific significance and empirical tractability.

Conclusions:

• The ongoing debate on single- and dual-process theories should not be abandoned but rather reframed.
• Understanding these theories as claims about cognitive models implementing one or two types of algorithms is crucial for advancing the field.