Scientific realism and empirical confirmation: A puzzle

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Epistemology
• Scientific Realism

Background:

• Scientific realism asserts the existence of empirically confirmed entities, regardless of observability.
• Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a key driver of this realism.
• A common claim is that IBE-driven realism does not require probabilistic reasoning.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate potential puzzles arising from non-probabilistic IBE-driven scientific realism.
• To examine situations where empirical confirmation is not yet achieved.
• To analyze the epistemic implications of commitment to empirically unconfirmed objects.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of scientific realism and IBE.
• Examination of scientific contexts lacking full empirical confirmation.
• Logical assessment of epistemic redundancy in realism.

Main Results:

• A puzzle emerges in scientific contexts where non-probabilistic IBE is applied before full empirical confirmation.
• Realists employing this approach are committed to the existence of empirically unconfirmed objects.
• The lack of probabilistic features in IBE renders subsequent empirical confirmation epistemically redundant for realism.

Conclusions:

• Non-probabilistic IBE-driven scientific realism faces a significant epistemic puzzle.
• Commitment to unconfirmed objects without probabilistic justification creates redundancy.
• This challenges the sufficiency of non-probabilistic IBE for robust scientific realism.