Towards a cross-level understanding of Bayesian inference in the brain

Perception emerges from unconscious probabilistic inference, which guides behaviour in our ubiquitously uncertain environment. Bayesian decision theory is a prominent computational model that describes how people make rational decisions using noisy and ambiguous sensory observations. However, critical questions have been raised about the validity of the Bayesian framework in explaining the mental process of inference. Firstly, some natural behaviours deviate from Bayesian optimum. Secondly, the neural mechanisms that support Bayesian computations in the brain are yet to be understood. Taking Marr's cross level approach, we review the recent progress made in addressing these challenges. We first review studies that combined behavioural paradigms and modelling approaches to explain both optimal and suboptimal behaviours. Next, we evaluate the theoretical advances and the current evidence for ecologically feasible algorithms and neural implementations in the brain, which may enable probabilistic inference. We argue that this cross-level approach is necessary for the worthwhile pursuit to uncover mechanistic accounts of human behaviour.