Putting inference to the best explanation into context

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Epistemology

Background:

• The placement of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is debated, with some scholars suggesting it belongs to the context of pursuit rather than justification.
• Peircean abduction, a precursor to IBE, is increasingly viewed as part of discovery and pursuit.
• Challenges in reconciling IBE with Bayesianism have prompted proposals for a non-justificatory role for IBE, aligning it with pursuit.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate the arguments for situating Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) within the context of pursuit.
• To determine if recent scholarly developments necessitate a reclassification of IBE from justification to pursuit.
• To analyze the relationship between IBE, abduction, and Bayesianism in the context of epistemic appraisal.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and its relationship to abduction.
• Examination of arguments for placing IBE in the context of pursuit.
• Evaluation of the compatibility of IBE with Bayesianism and probabilistic frameworks.
• Philosophical argumentation regarding the nature of epistemic justification.

Main Results:

• Arguments for relocating IBE to the context of pursuit are not sufficiently strong.
• IBE is distinct from Peircean abduction and has been reconceptualized in ways that make it unsuitable for the pursuit context.
• Difficulties in reconciling IBE with Bayesianism do not invalidate its role in justification, as justification is not exclusively probabilistic.

Conclusions:

• Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) should remain situated within the context of justification.
• IBE's distinct conceptualization differentiates it from abduction and its role in pursuit.
• The compatibility of IBE with Bayesianism should not be the sole determinant of its epistemic role; justification can encompass non-probabilistic elements.