Protecting FPGA-Based Cryptohardware Implementations from Fault Attacks Using ADCs.

Area of Science:

• Hardware security
• Cryptography
• Embedded systems

Background:

• Confidential data requires protection via cryptographic algorithms.
• Physical implementations of these algorithms are vulnerable to fault injection attacks.
• Fault injection attacks exploit device malfunctions to leak sensitive information.

Purpose of the Study:

• To present a hardware design methodology using analog-to-digital converters (ADCs).
• To detect physical attacks on cryptocircuits and prevent information leakage.
• To enhance the security of data exchanged between connected devices.

Main Methods:

• Developed FPGA-based ADC modules to monitor temperature and supply voltage.
• Implemented setups to test the detection scheme against voltage, temperature, and electromagnetic pulse variations.
• Designed a system to detect anomalies during fault injection attempts.

Main Results:

• The proposed ADC-based detectors successfully identified 100% of fault injection attacks.
• An alarm signal was activated upon detecting deviations from the normal operating range.
• Confidential information leakage was effectively prevented during simulated attacks.

Conclusions:

• The hardware design methodology using ADCs provides robust protection against fault injection attacks.
• The system ensures data confidentiality by detecting and mitigating physical security threats.
• This approach significantly enhances the security of cryptographic implementations in connected devices.