Potential corporate uses of polygenic indexes: Starting a conversation about the associated ethics and policy issues

Some commercial firms currently sell polygenic indexes (PGIs) to individual consumers, despite their relatively low predictive power. It might be tempting to assume that because the predictive power of many PGIs is so modest, other sorts of firms-such as those selling insurance and financial services-will not be interested in using PGIs for their own purposes. We argue to the contrary. We build this argument in two ways. First, we offer a very simple model, rooted in economic theory, of a profit-maximizing firm that can gain information about a single consumer's genome. We use the model to show that, depending on the specific economic environment, a firm would be willing to pay for statistically noisy PGIs, even if they allow for only a small reduction in uncertainty. Second, we describe two plausible scenarios in which these different kinds of firms could conceivably use PGIs to maximize profits. Finally, we briefly discuss some of the associated ethics and policy issues. They deserve more attention, which is unlikely to be given until it is first recognized that firms whose services affect a large swath of the public will indeed have incentives to use PGIs.