(Ir)rationality of Moral Judgment.

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Moral Psychology
• Decision Science

Background:

• Societal challenges like COVID-19, political polarization, and misinformation prompt questions about the rationality of moral judgments.
• Transitivity, a key rationality criterion in behavioral, biological, and economic sciences, is empirically challenging to assess.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop and apply the first mathematically sound test for transitivity in moral preferences.
• To investigate whether observed moral judgments reflect underlying rational structures or widespread irrationality.

Main Methods:

• Tested three probabilistic models: weak utility, a noise-limited variant, and the general random utility hypothesis.
• Empirically evaluated moral preference transitivity in 28 individuals using these models.
• Employed Bayesian model selection to compare model performance.

Main Results:

• All participants' data aligned with the weak utility and general random utility models, supporting probabilistic transitivity.
• A model assuming highly consistent, low-noise transitive preferences was rejected.
• Bayesian analysis favored probabilistic transitive preferences, aligning with the random utility hypothesis.

Conclusions:

• The findings suggest an underlying order in moral judgments, challenging assumptions of widespread irrationality.
• Moral decision-making appears to involve probabilistic transitivity, accommodating individual uncertainty and heterogeneity.
• Policymakers can leverage this understanding to navigate complex societal dynamics rather than assuming a disregard for moral principles.