Analysis of Complex Network Attack and Defense Game Strategies Under Uncertain Value Criterion.

Area of Science:

• Network security
• Game theory
• Complex network theory

Background:

• Existing research often assumes complete information and shared value criteria between attackers and defenders.
• Real-world scenarios frequently involve asymmetric value perception, leading to differing evaluation criteria.
• This discrepancy impacts decision-making in critical infrastructure security games.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze attack-defense game decision-making when attackers and defenders have distinct target value evaluation criteria.
• To investigate the influence of asymmetric value perception on strategic choices in network security.
• To provide more practical solutions for games with uncertain value criteria.

Main Methods:

• Game-theoretic analysis adapted for asymmetric value perception.
• Examination of "advantage ranges" for attacker and defender strategies.
• Probabilistic inference of defender strategies using small-sample detection outcomes.

Main Results:

• Identified "advantage ranges" for both attacker and defender value assessment, driven by topological heterogeneity.
• Demonstrated that within these ranges, clear-cut optimal strategies exist independently of opponent decisions.
• Developed methods for attackers to infer defender strategies outside advantage ranges based on detection outcomes.

Conclusions:

• Asymmetric value perception is a critical factor in attack-defense games within critical infrastructure.
• Topological heterogeneity fundamentally influences strategic advantage ranges.
• The study offers practical insights for optimizing security strategies in environments with uncertain value criteria.