Clocks, events, and the ontology of perceiving and acting

James Gibson introduced the concept of ecological physics. Gibson asserted that contemporary physics, such as general relativity, was not relevant to perceiving and acting. One area in which Gibson claimed that ecological physics differed from contemporary physics was in concepts of time and temporality. Gibson argued that time is intrinsic to physical events that are spatially and temporally extensive, and is not (as in general relativity) an abstract medium within which events occur. In this article, we contrast Gibson's concept of time with time as it is conceptualized within general relativity, in which time is extrinsic to physical events. We do not criticize general relativity as a theory of physics. Rather, we argue that Gibson's concept of intrinsic time in ecological physics is not compatible with concepts of time used in general relativity. We develop our argument through an analysis of clocks. We argue that clocks do not detect the abstract, extrinsic concept of time of general relativity but, instead, detect only physical events that are extensive in time and space. For that reason, we suggest that clocks conform with ecological physics, rather than with general relativity. We further argue that the concept of extrinsic time that is central to general relativity should not be taken as the default in behavioral science studies of "time perception." In conclusion, we argue that Gibson's concept of time as being intrinsic to physical events has implications for our understanding of how perceiving and acting in the behavioral sciences relate to concepts in general relativity.