Disclosures and refutations: clinical psychoanalysis as a logic of enquiry

The author argues that the empirical status of psychoanalysis has been distorted by the controversy surrounding Aristotelian and Galilean-Newtonian schemes of science, whose core ideas, respectively, are scientific concepts or forms and scientific laws. Bound by the Euclidian axiomatic tradition, Newtonian-style 'laws' do not obtain in the social sciences, and in biology they apply only at near-molecular levels, not at the level of mind. Continuing the traditional Aristotelian reliance on 'exemplars', neither Freud's nor Darwin's work fits the deductivist, infallibilistic scientific criteria used by philosophers such as Tarski, Popper or Grünbaum. Rebutting the charge that the workings of psychoanalysis are not explicit enough, this paper unfolds the logic of enquiry it utilises. In contrast to Newtonian inductivism, Popper's method of conjectures and refutations and Lakatos's method of proofs and refutations, clinical psychoanalysis employs a 'practical logic' of disclosures and refutations, a constantly evolving enquiry of multi-layered and tentative evidence of discordance and analogy. Such epistemic fallibilism, relying on a build-up of ostensive evidences rather than on 'certainties', is illustrated in the text by Moore's famous 'two-hands' argument, is held to fit in with the workings of everyday discernment and, arguably, with Darwinian evolution.