Jove
Visualize
Contact Us
JoVE
x logofacebook logolinkedin logoyoutube logo
ABOUT JoVE
OverviewLeadershipBlogJoVE Help Center
AUTHORS
Publishing ProcessEditorial BoardScope & PoliciesPeer ReviewFAQSubmit
LIBRARIANS
TestimonialsSubscriptionsAccessResourcesLibrary Advisory BoardFAQ
RESEARCH
JoVE JournalMethods CollectionsJoVE Encyclopedia of ExperimentsArchive
EDUCATION
JoVE CoreJoVE BusinessJoVE Science EducationJoVE Lab ManualFaculty Resource CenterFaculty Site
Terms & Conditions of Use
Privacy Policy
Policies

Related Experiment Videos

Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Güth1, van Damme E

  • 1Humboldt Universität

Journal of Mathematical Psychology
|December 16, 1998
PubMed
Summary

In ultimatum bargaining games with an inactive third party, proposers make greedier offers when less information about the proposed split is revealed. Reduced information leads to higher demands from the proposer.

Related Concept Videos

You might also read

Related Articles

Articles linked to this work by shared authors, journal, and citation graph.

Sort by
Same author

Male fights of hamadryas baboons

Journal of theoretical biology·1998
Same author

Furosemide Distinguishes Central and Peripheral Tinnitus.

The international tinnitus journal·1995
Same author

Energy-momentum restrictions on the creation of Gott time machines.

Physical review. D, Particles and fields·1994
Same author

An obstacle to building a time machine.

Physical review letters·1992
Same author

Density fluctuations in extended inflation.

Physical review. D, Particles and fields·1992
Same author

Quantum creation of topological defects during inflation.

Physical review. D, Particles and fields·1991

Area of Science:

  • Behavioral Economics
  • Game Theory
  • Experimental Economics

Background:

  • Ultimatum bargaining games typically involve two players: a proposer and a responder.
  • The presence of an inactive third player introduces a novel dynamic to the standard bargaining model.
  • Information asymmetry regarding the proposed allocation can influence bargaining outcomes.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To investigate how information conditions affect proposer behavior in a three-player ultimatum game.
  • To analyze the impact of message content on the fairness of proposed resource allocation.
  • To determine the relationship between information revealed and proposer's demand.

Main Methods:

  • Experimental design simulating a three-player ultimatum bargaining scenario (Proposer X, Responder Y, Inactive Z).

Related Experiment Videos

  • Proposer X suggests an allocation (x, y, z) of a divisible resource ('cake').
  • Three distinct message conditions were employed: full proposal (m=(x, y, z)), responder's share (m=y), and third party's share (m=z), with information being common knowledge.

    • Main Results:

    • Proposer's offers were significantly influenced by the information condition.
    • A decrease in message information content correlated with an increase in the proposer's demand (x).
    • When only the third party's share was revealed (m=z), the modal proposal allocated nearly the entire resource to the proposer (X).

    Conclusions:

    • Information revelation plays a critical role in shaping fairness perceptions and bargaining outcomes.
    • Proposers exploit information asymmetry to secure larger shares of the resource.
    • Responder (Y) received approximately one-third of the resource on average in conditions with more information.