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Types of Selection

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Natural selection influences the frequencies of particular alleles and phenotypes within populations in several different ways. Primarily, natural selection can be directional, stabilizing, or disruptive. Directional selection favors one extreme trait and shifts the population towards that phenotype while selecting against individuals displaying alternate traits. Stabilizing selection favors an intermediate trait with a narrow range of variation. Deviation from the optimal phenotype towards an...

Evolution of New Traits in Microbes

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Microorganisms evolve rapidly due to their large population sizes and short generation times, often exhibiting measurable changes within days under laboratory conditions. Natural selection acts on standing genetic variation, enabling the retention and amplification of beneficial traits that confer fitness advantages in changing environments.Adaptive Pigment Regulation in RhodobacterIn Rhodobacter, a genus of purple non-sulfur bacteria, light-harvesting pigments such as bacteriochlorophyll and...

What is Natural Selection?

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Natural selection is an evolutionary process in which individuals with survival-promoting traits reproduce at higher rates. These favorable traits become more common within a population or species. Naturally selected traits initially arise via random genetic mutations. In order for selection to occur, there must be variation within a population, the trait controlling the variation must be heritable, and there must be an evolutionary advantage for variation in the trait.The Theory of Natural...

Natural Selection and Mating Preferences

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The principle of natural selection posits that organisms better adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and reproduce. This principle is closely intertwined with mating preferences, a key aspect of sexual selection, which evolutionary psychologists believe is driven by instincts to propagate one's genes. Such instincts significantly influence mating behaviors and preferences between genders.
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Frequency-dependent Selection

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When the fitness of a trait is influenced by how common it is (i.e., its frequency) relative to different traits within a population, this is referred to as frequency-dependent selection. Frequency-dependent selection may occur between species or within a single species. This type of selection can either be positive—with more common phenotypes having higher fitness—or negative, with rarer phenotypes conferring increased fitness.Positive Frequency-Dependent SelectionIn positive...

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Organisms that are well-adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and reproduce. However, natural selection does not lead to perfectly adapted organisms. Several factors constrain natural selection.For one, natural selection can only act upon existing genetic variation. Hypothetically, redtusks may enhance elephant survival by deterring ivory-seeking poachers. However, if there are no gene variants—or alleles—for redtusks, natural selection cannot increase the prevalence of...

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Endogenous Groups and Dynamic Selection in Mechanism Design.

Gabriel A Madeira¹, Robert M Townsend

¹Department of Economics, Universidade de São Paulo, Cidade Universitária, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 908,05508-900, São Paulo, SP, Brazil.

Journal of Economic Theory

|January 29, 2010

Summary

This summary is machine-generated.

This study models how inequality and organizational structures interact. It finds that low inequality favors individualistic regimes, while high inequality promotes risk-sharing groups, influencing economic dynamics.

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Area of Science:

Economics
Game Theory
Organizational Economics

Background:

Existing models often treat organizational form and inequality separately.
Understanding the interplay between information, inequality, and group formation is crucial for economic stability.

Purpose of the Study:

To develop a dynamic theory of endogenous risk-sharing groups and their coexistence with individualistic regimes.
To simultaneously determine inequality and organizational form within an economic model.

Main Methods:

Utilized numerical techniques and mechanism design re-formulations.
Employed suitable choices of promised utilities to compute stochastic steady states and transitions.
Analyzed the impact of coalition prevention costs on organizational emergence.

Main Results:

Low inequality/high wealth regions favor relative performance (individualistic) regimes.
High inequality/low wealth regions favor risk-sharing groups.
Coalition costs can also lead to risk-sharing groups at high wealth levels.

Conclusions:

Organizational form and inequality are endogenously determined and interdependent.
Transitions between regimes are driven by inequality exacerbation and changes in utility promises.
Specific regions of inequality and wealth can lead to persistent organizational forms or high volatility.