Resilient control design for networked DC microgrids under time-constrained DoS attacks.

Area of Science:

• Electrical Engineering
• Control Systems
• Networked Systems

Background:

• Networked DC microgrids are vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
• Existing DoS models often focus on frequency and duration, not sporadic attack characteristics.
• Constant Power Loads (CPLs) introduce unique challenges in microgrid stability.

Purpose of the Study:

• To design a resilient current controller for DC microgrids under a novel time-constrained DoS attack model.
• To develop a control strategy that maintains system stability and performance during sporadic attacks.
• To propose a new method for resilient controller design considering attack duration.

Main Methods:

• A new time-constrained DoS attack model focusing on sporadic attack durations.
• Construction of a switching state feedback control law.
• Establishment of a switching-like DC microgrid system model.
• Application of an attack-parameter-dependent time-varying Lyapunov function (TVLF) method.

Main Results:

• Derivation of an exponential stability criterion for the DC microgrid under aperiodic DoS attacks.
• Proposal of a novel resilient controller design method.
• Verification of the controller's effectiveness and resilience through simulations.

Conclusions:

• The proposed resilient current controller effectively maintains desired control performance in DC microgrids.
• The new control design scheme demonstrates significant resilience against the novel time-constrained DoS attacks.
• The study validates the importance of considering sporadic attack characteristics in control system design.