Uncertain Facts or Uncertain Values? Testing the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Uncertainty in Moral...

Area of Science:

• Psychology
• Moral Philosophy
• Cognitive Science

Background:

• Philosophical distinctions exist between empirical uncertainty (about facts) and normative uncertainty (about values) in moral judgments.
• Psychological research investigating this distinction is limited, leaving its empirical basis unclear.

Purpose of the Study:

• To empirically investigate the psychological reality of the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty.
• To determine if these represent distinct psychological states influencing moral judgments.

Main Methods:

• Study 1 utilized a factor-analytical approach with 265 participants describing and rating aspects of moral uncertainty.
• Study 2 employed an experimental design with 402 participants rating scenarios varying in consequence uncertainty and value conflict.

Main Results:

• Factor analysis revealed three distinct factors: lack of information, unclear consequences (empirical uncertainty), and normative uncertainty.
• Experimental manipulation confirmed that consequence uncertainty primarily affected empirical factors, while value conflict primarily affected normative uncertainty.

Conclusions:

• The distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty is psychologically valid and reflects different cognitive processes.
• Findings support the differentiation of uncertainty types in moral judgment research and decision-making.
• This research contributes to understanding folk metaethics and the psychological underpinnings of moral reasoning.