A Game-Theoretical Model to Improve Process Plant Protection from Terrorist Attacks

Area of Science:

• Operational security research
• Game theory applications in risk assessment
• Intelligent adversary modeling

Background:

• The 9/11 attacks highlighted the need for advanced operational security research.
• Traditional risk assessment methods are inadequate for deliberate, intelligent adversaries.
• Game theory provides a framework for analyzing strategic interactions in security.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a game-theoretical model for security management in process plants.
• To analyze intrusion detection systems within a game-theoretic context.
• To explore strategic decision-making against intelligent adversaries.

Main Methods:

• Development of a game-theoretical model for process plant security.
• Assumption of rational players with complete information.
• Analysis of both pure and mixed strategy solutions.

Main Results:

• The proposed model illustrates security management challenges in process plants.
• An illustrative case demonstrated the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
• No pure strategy equilibrium was found in the case study.

Conclusions:

• Game theory is a valuable tool for modeling and managing security in process plants.
• Mixed strategy equilibria are important considerations for operational security.
• The research provides a foundation for further game-theoretic security analysis.