Why Intellectual Disability is Not Mere Difference

Area of Science:

• Disability Studies
• Philosophy
• Bioethics

Background:

• The mere difference view posits physical/sensory disabilities do not inherently reduce well-being, attributing negative impacts to social injustice.
• Elizabeth Barnes's Value Neutral Model supports the mere difference view for physical and sensory impairments.

Purpose of the Study:

• To evaluate the applicability of the mere difference view and Barnes's Value Neutral Model to intellectual disability.
• To argue that intellectual disability represents an intrinsic, universal, and global harm to well-being.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
• Critique of the Value Neutral Model's extension to intellectual disability.

Main Results:

• Intellectual disability is intrinsically bad, negatively impacting well-being independent of environmental factors.
• Intellectual disability is universally bad, lowering quality of life for all individuals with this condition.
• Intellectual disability is globally bad, reducing a person's overall well-being.

Conclusions:

• The Value Neutral Model does not adequately account for the harms associated with intellectual disability.
• Intellectual disability constitutes a negative difference, distinct from social injustice.
• Lower quality of life for individuals with intellectual disability does not imply lesser moral status or warrant discriminatory clinical practices.