Mechanistic decomposition and reduction in complex, context-sensitive systems.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Neuroscience
• Systems Biology

Background:

• Arguments from complexity in biological and neural systems often conclude emergence and a failure of reductionist explanation.
• Context-sensitivity is typically viewed as a challenge to reductionism, as it implies higher-level factors influence lower-level components.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the inference from system complexity and context-sensitivity to the failure of mechanistic/reductionist explanation.
• To demonstrate that context-sensitivity is compatible with reductionist approaches in complex systems.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation focusing on the concept of context-sensitivity.
• Analysis of arguments within the philosophy of science regarding emergence and reductionism.
• Examination of findings in neuroscience related to context-specific reorganizations.

Main Results:

• Context-sensitivity does not inherently preclude reductionist explanation.
• Mechanisms underlying context-specific reorganizations can be identified, supporting a reductionist framework.
• Neuroscience frequently discovers such mechanisms, providing empirical support for this view.

Conclusions:

• The complexity and context-sensitivity of biological and neural systems do not necessitate the failure of mechanistic or reductionist explanation.
• Identifying mechanisms for context-specific changes allows for a reductionist understanding of complex systems.
• Neuroscientific evidence supports the reconcilability of context-sensitivity with reductionism.